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European Translation Studies, 
Une science qui dérange, and 
Why Equivalence Needn't Be 
a Dirty Word 
Anthony Pym 
I take the term "translation studies" as an accepted and acceptable 
name for the general ruck of writings, debates, and research on 
aspects of translation. "European" here means whatever is talked 
about in a disintegrated Europe, which might as well extend to 
Israel, Sudan, the Philippines, or Texas. The expression une science 
qui dérange - roughly "a science that upsets" - is one of the ways 
Pierre Bourdieu describes his sociology in an interview published in 
1980. To trace this latter reference is obviously to pose chestnuts 
like whether translation studies can legitimately be described as a 
"science." Less naively, however, the collocation proposes a specific 
conceptual frame, in fact a straight comparison. It asks if translation 
studies is or could be a science like Bourdieu's sociology. Is it in a 
position to upset anyone? If so, whom? If not, why not? 
Debates over equivalence enter the scene as a major testing 
ground for these questions. They basically concern beliefs that some 
aspect of a source-text unit can equal some aspect of a target-text 
unit, although the points of contention are the nature, location, 
importance, and veracity of such beliefs. As such, the debates 
configure only one of several issues involving the status of 
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translation studies. We could also look at relations with literary 
studies, or a certain latent capacity to upset closed visions of 
cultures. The issue of equivalence is by no means the only area in 
which translation studies has been caught between legitimation and 
provocation, between a desire to look like other disciplines and a 
potential to upset other disciplines. The debates over equivalence 
have nevertheless accrued singular historical depth and particularly 
polarized positions. Some think the idea of equivalence legitimates 
translation studies; others seem upset by this. I propose to recount 
a brief history of the dialectics involved, not without taking up a 
particular position myself. First, however, let me borrow a 
conceptual frame able to make the story interesting. 
1. Whom Might Bourdieu Upset? 
Much of what Bourdieu says about sociology should sound strangely 
familiar to scholars of translation: 
Sociology has the sad privilege of being constantly confronted 
with the question of its status as a science. People are a thousand-
times less demanding with respect to history or ethnography, not 
to mention geography, philology, or archeology. Constantly 
questioned, sociologists constantly ask questions of both 
themselves and others. All this makes sociology look like an 
imperialistic science. How can a science that is scarcely beginning 
to stand on its feet be so presumptuous as to put other sciences 
under its microscope? Of course I believe sociology is a science. 
In fact, the questions it asks of other sciences are those that are 
particularly problematic for sociology itself. Sociology is a critical 
science because it is itself in a critical position. (1980, pp. 19-20, 
my translation, italics in the text.) 
The question of scientific status - often expressed as scholarliness 
- has been similarly problematic for translation studies, and perhaps 
for reasons similarly associated with its position as a relative 
newcomer. Although we do not actually take other sciences as entire 
objects of study, the potential is built into the fact we draw on and 
question the approaches of the more established disciplines. Yet 
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Bourdieu gives further good reasons why a science might upset 
people: 
Because it reveals things that are hidden and sometimes 
suppressed,\ike the fact that success at school correlates not with 
'intelligence' but with social background and more exactly with 
the cultural capital inherited from one's family. These are truths 
that technocrats and epistemocrats - that is, a good number of 
those who read and finance sociology - do not like to hear. (p. 20, 
italics in the text) 
Is translation studies involved in the revelation of such truths, 
suppressed as in psychoanalysis (Bourdieu's term is refoulées) 
because socially disturbing? Are we in a position to upset those who 
read and finance our activities? Or do we lack the empirical 
paraphernalia, the questionnaires, the statistics and schemata that 
enable sociology to claim quantitative truths that are apparently 
neutral and objective? But for Bourdieu, who opposes his sociology 
to that of "social engineers" who would control individuals, the 
value of such scientific procedures is itself quite relative. 
Sociological findings are by no means discovered from a position of 
simple objectivity or neutrality: 
The possibilities of helping to produce truth depend on two main 
factors: the interest one has in having the truth known (or 
inversely, in hiding it from others and from oneself) and the 
capacity one has to produce it. As Bachelard put it, there can only 
be a science of that which is hidden. Sociologists are best armed 
to dis-cover what is hidden when they have the best scientific 
weapons, when they best use the concepts, methods, and 
techniques developed by their predecessors [...]. And they are 
most "critical" when their conscious or unconscious intention is 
most subversive, when they are most interested in revealing that 
which is censored or suppressed in the social world, (pp. 22-23, 
italics in the text.) 
Sociologists should use all the scientific weapons available to them, 
since they are involved in a conflictual situation from the outset. Yet 
the use of such arms does not exclude subjective investment on the 
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part of the sociologist, who has an interest not only in revealing 
hidden things but also in appearing to be objectively disinterested 
about this process. Further, although subjective investment by no 
means invalidates the knowledge produced, recognition of this 
subjectivity requires that sociology undertake the sociology of 
sociologists, periodically turning its questions in on itself, 
objectifying rather than hiding the truth of its frail human 
dimension. Sociologists become one of the objects of their own 
scientific research. 
This is not the place to explain all of Bourdieu. I cite these 
now classical passages merely to indicate a few of the points where 
comparison might help us relativize our own problems with 
equivalence, particularly the problems that concern ideals of 
objectivity and neutrality. The citations should nevertheless illustrate 
a few of Bourdieu's more general formulas like the need to 
"subjectify the objective" (apparently disinterested scientific truths 
are in the interest of a certain subjectivity) and, inversely, the need 
to "objectify the subjective" (the very material of such truths is the 
subjectivity of people involved in social practices, of which 
sociology itself is one). How might these statements apply to 
translation studies? 
2. In and Out of Equivalence 
In 1979 Werner Koller identified a "legitimation crisis" in European 
translation studies: 
This science [Wissenschaft] has perhaps been more or less 
established as an independent discipline in some universities. But 
the relations and understandings between it and other fields of 
scientific inquiry is in no way unequivocal, settled, or 
unproblematic. We have not (yet) overcome the legitimation crisis 
concerning the relation between translation science and translation 
practice, nor that between translation science and other scientific 
disciplines such as contrastive linguistics and stylistics, 
comparative literature, and computational linguistics. (1979, p. 10; 
my translation.) 
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This seems to imply that translation studies was already doing the 
right things, It just had to be formally legitimated, especially with 
respect to its neighboring disciplines. But did anyone imagine this 
could be done without conflict? Given the limitations on university 
budgets, on student enrollments, and on publication possibilities, the 
emergence of a new discipline surely implied some degree of 
submergence for others. Particularly where translation was 
traditionally taught in departments of language and literature, the 
association of an independent translation studies with the 
independent training of translators was bound to create tension and 
confrontation1. Opposition on this institutional level could not help 
but question the scientific legitimacy of translation studies. 
Subjective interests motivated arguments for and against scientific 
status, and did so in a way that was rather more demanding than 
might have been the case for many of the more established 
disciplines. 
Roller's response to this problem, elaborated in his 
Einführung of 1979, was to bring together and systematize much of 
the work that had already been done. In practice, he assumed the 
essential solution had already been found. It just had to be cleaned 
up, put on show, and developed. A major part of this solution was 
the notion of translational equivalence. Yet this term was not just 
pulled out of a hat. It had its reasons, and it even had a mildly 
revolutionary import. 
Koller presented translational equivalence as an argument 
against theories of general untranslatability (this opposition is further 
stressed in the revised fourth edition of 1992), cutting across what 
were at that time all-embracing debates about linguistic relativity or 
language universais2. Since translational equivalence was seen as 
1. See Caminade in this volume. 
2. Roller's translational equivalence, focused on the level of parole, 
was certainly designed to overcome the deadlock between 
relativist and universalist linguistics. But it had little effect on 
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existing on the level of translation as language use (parole), it was 
not reducible to formal correspondences or differences between 
language systems. This was something that could potentially upset 
theories that were so lost in language systems that they failed to see 
the actual pragmatics of translation. Georges Mounin had actually 
deployed much the same strategy more than a decade earlier, 
following the rediscovery of Saussure and the rise of relativist 
structuralism: "If the current theses on lexical, morphological, and 
syntactic structures are accepted, one must conclude that translation 
is impossible. And yet translators exist, they produce, and their 
products are found to be useful" (1963, p. 5). Since translators and 
translations existed, translation must be possible and equivalence 
must therefore exist as well. Such was the general argument in favor 
of translational equivalence as a concept able to challenge a certain 
closed linguistics. The study of language systems had suppressed 
translation; theories of equivalence could dis-cover translation. Of 
course, there was a troublesome gap between the social existence of 
translations and the linguistic analysis of substantial equivalence. But 
this gap seems not to have bothered the translation theorists of the 
1970s. Their argument was strategic, contestational, and reasonably 
successful as a bid for legitimation. 
Bear in mind that Koller was writing at a time when a few 
tons of linguistics, from Hjelmslev to Catford and Searle, could be 
cited in support of translatability and thus as a basis for equivalence. 
Koller's theorizing was and remains an affair of language; there was 
no need to oppose the whole of linguistics. This was very useful in 
1979. It could effectively pass on some of the authority of what was 
still the most prestigious of the human sciences. Theorists of 
equivalence could moreover be presented as technical engineers 
interested in the better control of translation as a social practice. 
Their aim was the regulation and improvement of standards (as 
classical conflicts between word and sense. Indeed, dichotomies 
like Nida's "formal equivalence" and "dynamic equivalence" 
dressed the classical word-versus-sense debate in the clothes of 
equivalence. 
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explicitly stated in texts like Reiss 1971). Equivalence thus became 
a piece of scientific capital, stretching out into a general paradigm 
with a few ounces of institutional power. It provided the foundation 
for research programmes supposedly useful for both machine-
translation research and translator training. These fields in turn 
responded to the rising social and political demand for controllable 
transcultural communication, particularly in what was then the 
European Community. Translation studies was made to look like a 
science worthy of financial support. It was also made to look like 
applied linguistics. As such, the equivalence paradigm enjoyed a 
degree of success in advancing the cause of moderately independent 
research programmes and translator-training institutes. The concept 
was institutionalized. And no one had much time for the paradigm 
that had supposedly been upset, the belief in untranslatability. 
Yet the 1980s had other concepts up its sleeve. The decade 
would see linguistic concepts of translational equivalence challenged 
in at least two ways. 
For the historico-descriptivismof Toury (1980), equivalence 
was something automatically produced by all ostensible translations 
no matter what their linguistic or aesthetic quality. Thus defined, the 
concept was rendered effectively useless for linguists, technocrats, 
and anyone else interested in Koller-like legitimation. If equivalence 
was already everywhere, or almost, it could not be used 
prescriptively. Would-be social engineers could make no use of it to 
improve social communication. Worse, it could not easily support 
concrete institutionalization in the fields of machine translation or 
translator training. For Toury, the confidence of linguistic experts 
should logically give way to detailed descriptive work on actual 
translations in their historical contexts. If equivalence had upset no 
more than the occasional belief in untranslatability, Toury's 
extension of it at least had the potential to upset prescriptive 
linguists and pedagogs. 
For the target-side functionalism of Vermeer, on the other 
hand, equivalence was only one of many goals that a translator 
could set out to attain, since translations could serve a range of 
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communicative purposes (1989, p. 120 & passim). The determinant 
on translation was not the source text, as had been assumed by 
linguistic approaches to equivalence, but the intended function or 
Skopos of the translation as a text in its own right and in its own 
situation. This so-called Skopostheorie was also potentially upsetting, 
at least for linguists and teachers of translation who had never 
looked beyond source-text criteria. 
As revolutionary as these two approaches could have been, 
neither of them denied that a translator could set out to produce one 
kind of equivalence or another. Nor did they deny scientific 
objectivity as an essential goal for translation studies. They simply 
refused to base their scientific status on equivalence. They chose 
other weapons. Toury and friends have invoked systems, hypotheses, 
empirical testing, and the search for probabilistic laws. Vermeer and 
company have developed a rich assortment of technical-sounding 
names for various aspects of translation, combining discursive 
precision with metalinguistic elitism. One of the curious outcomes 
is that whereas Toury helped develop a mode of corpus-based 
research where "a translation is any target-language utterance which 
is presented or regarded as such" (1985, p. 20), Vermeer's influence 
fits in with the fact that prospective students at Heidelberg are told 
that the institute's German term Translation (not Übersetzen) does 
not correspond to "the translating and interpreting that unthinkingly 
duplicates linguistic forms and structures" ("das unreflektiert 
Sprachformen und -strukturen nachvollziehende 'Übersetzen' und 
'Dolmetschen'.")(1992, p. 2). For historico-descriptivists, translation 
is anything people commonly think it is (social practice can't be 
wrong). For the Heidelberg text, translation is precisely not what 
people commonly think it is, especially if they imagine it is a matter 
of producing equivalents for source texts (social practice can be 
correctively engineered). In the first case, science is empirical 
investigation; it goes out into the world and can advance on the 
basis of the material it analyzes. In the second, science is a matter 
of knowing what others have to find out; students come to you and 
advance on the basis of your theoretical expertise (and if social 
agents don't always know what a translation really is, they too can 
become your students). Clearly, neither of these approaches needed 
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a strong concept of equivalence, which soon seemed unable to 
objectify anything of interest about translation. Having become 
either too large (for Toury et al) or too small (for Vermeer et al), 
the concept gradually lost its status as scientific capital. It became 
a dirty word. 
What really happened here? The dates could be misleading. 
Koller published in 1979, but his text survived through four editions 
to 1992 and is still worth reading. Toury was published in book 
form in Israel in 1980, but his work has taken years to filter through 
to some kind of general recognition. The writings of Vermeer and 
friends, published mostly in German and often in small university 
editions, has been so slow to catch on that the group still feels 
revolutionary more than ten years after the Grundlegung einer 
allgemeinen Translationstheorie of 1984. The space of European 
translation studies is spread so thinly and remains so fragmented that 
these various paradigms have mostly managed to co-exist in tacit 
ignorance of each other. There is no evidence of any catastrophic 
debate being resolved one way or the other. Critique and change 
have been more the stuff of a general drift directed by minor pushes 
and pulls in many isolated parts of the world. The details are no 
doubt best told by the scholars involved. Yet there can be little 
doubt that the general trend was away from equivalence and toward 
target-side criteria. Of course, this was more or less in keeping with 
the movement of linguistics toward discourse analysis, the 
development of reception aesthetics, the sociological interest in 
action theory, and the general critique of structuralist abstraction. 
European translation studies was no hotbed of intellectual 
originality. Nor is it a dialectician's paradise today. 
The approaches on the rise in the 1980s nevertheless 
dis-covered a previously suppressed (or insufficiently recognized) 
truth, namely the social and historical relativity of translational 
equivalence. Many of the linguistic categories that had previously 
been considered objective could now have been seen as largely 
subjective constructs. Beyond the restricted field of specialized 
terminology, theorists could no longer be sure that a given 
source-text unit was necessarily equivalent to a specific target-text 
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unit. Such a relation could only be norm-bound or probabilistic (for 
Toury) or subordinate to wider target-side considerations (for 
Vermeer). There would always be at least residual doubt about 
general claims to equivalence. 
This doubt should probably have undone the entire 
equivalence paradigm. It should have revealed the subjective interest 
that the theorists of equivalence - and their institutional supporters 
- had had when they tried to found a science of translation. We 
might say, with Bourdieu, that the objective could have been 
subjectified. The 1980s approaches could have done this. They could 
have become radically upsetting. But they didn't. Why not? 
3. The Critique of Equivalence 
Almost ten years after Roller's Einführung, Mary Snell-Hornby's 
"integrated approach" of 1988 sought to bring together and 
systematize the work that had been done to that date. As in Koller, 
the underlying assumption was that a certain compatibility was 
there; it just needed to be "integrated." The package was once again 
made to look faintly scientific, this time privileging American 
panaceas like prototypes and scenes-and-frames, along with a 
potpourri of common sense, and a disarming propensity to 
self-contradiction (notably with respect to the status of linguistic 
approaches). One of the most remarkable aspects of this 
"integrative" exercise was the list of effectively excluded 
approaches. Snell-Hornby's peremptory style dismissed two 
thousand years of translation theory as an inconclusive "heated 
discussion" opposing word to sense (1988, p. 9) (one finds the same 
inconclusiveness in theories of God, or love, and yet we keep 
talking). She dispatched historico-descriptivism because it had 
avoided evaluation (p. 26) (but hadn't it discovered anything?). Not 
surprisingly, she also forcefully discarded equivalence as being 
"unsuitable as a basic concept in translation theory" (p. 22). None 
of these excluded approaches, said Snell-Hornby, "have provided 
any substantial help in furthering translation studies" (p. 26). The 
interesting thing about these exclusions is that, unlike Toury or 
Vermeer, Snell-Hornby tried to indicate precisely where the 
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equivalence paradigm had gone wrong. This is where translation 
studies could have become truly upsetting. 
Some of the things Snell-Hornby says about equivalence are 
perceptive and stimulating (I use a precarious present tense because 
the text is due to be published in a revised edition). For example, 
she finds that in the course of the 1970s the English term 
"equivalence" became "increasingly approximative and vague to the 
point of complete insignificance," and its German counterpart (but 
what criterion did she have for putting the two terms together?) was 
"increasingly static and one-dimensional" (p. 21). This difference 
curiously maps onto the strategies of Toury and Vermeer as outlined 
above, suggesting that there was in fact no radical rupture between 
those who talked about equivalence and those who preferred not to 
(Toury accepted the English-language trend; Vermeer fell in with 
the German-language usage of the term). Summing up a very 
meandering argument, Snell-Hornby concludes that "the term 
equivalence, apart from being imprecise and ill-defined (even after 
a heated debate of over twenty years) presents an illusion of 
symmetry between languages which hardly exists beyond the level 
of vague approximations and which distorts the basic problems of 
translation" (p. 22). Some kind of equivalence could be integrated 
into its appropriate corner (technical terminology), but the 
equivalence paradigm should otherwise get out of the way. All 
potentially upsetting stuff. 
Snell-Hornby did not care that notions of equivalence had 
been strategically useful against theories of untranslatability, nor that 
they had effectively achieved a degree of institutional legitimation 
for translation studies. Hers was a different historical moment, with 
different strategies and goals. But even given the new context, at 
least one sleight of hand should be pointed out. If the term 
"equivalence" were really so polysemous - Snell-Hornby elsewhere 
claims to have located fifty-eight different types in German uses of 
the term (1986, p. 15) - , how could she be so sure it "presents an 
illusion of symmetry between languages"? The term apparently 
means nothing except this illusion. And yet none of the numerous 
linguists cited in Koller ever presupposed any "symmetry between 
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languages." Since Snell-Hornby gives no citation supporting her 
reduction of the term, this description of equivalence looks like hers. 
Of little import that the idealized symmetry between languages 
belonged more to the word/sense debate that Snell-Hornby strangely 
thinks the notion of equivalence had been born to overcome (p. 15). 
Indeed, had she looked a little further, Snell-Hornby might have 
found that concepts like Nida's "dynamic equivalence" presuppose 
substantial linguistic asymmetry. More important, Roller's actual 
proposal was based on studying equivalence on the level of parole, 
leaving to contrastive linguistics the entire question of symmetries 
or dissymmetries between language systems (1979, pp. 183-184). 
Where did Snell-Hornby get the idea that equivalence means 
"symmetry between languages"? She seems to have presented a 
limited range of variant usages, picked or projected the illusion that 
suits her, then assumed that everyone else suffered from the same 
hallucination. 
This was indeed moderately upsetting. Albrecht Neubert has 
observed the strategy clearly enough: "The narrow and hence 
mistaken interpretation of translational equivalence in terms of 
linguistic correspondence is in our opinion one of the main reasons 
that the very concept of equivalence has fallen into disrepute among 
many translation scholars." (1994, p. 414). That's more or less what 
has happened. But why did it happen? 
One can only suppose there was more than logic at stake in 
Snell-Hornby's critique of equivalence. An element of power, 
perhaps? Snell-Hornby's Integrative Approach has indeed had 
influence, and may yet find more. It was the right title at the right 
time, lying in wait for the massive growth of translator-training 
institutions that took off at the end of the decade. 
Yet this is not the story of just one person. There is more 
at stake in the movement away from equivalence. Strangely, while 
European translation studies has generally been expanding, a center 
of strong equivalence-based research at Leipzig, closely associated 
with Professor Neubert, has been all but dismantled by west-German 
academic experts. Further, the one west-European translation 
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institute that has been threatened with reduction - Saarbrücken - is 
precisely the one that, through Wilss, is most clearly aligned with 
linguistics and the equivalence paradigm3. This is not to mention 
the numerous east-Europeans who still - heaven forbid! - talk about 
linguistics and equivalence, awaiting enlightenment from the more 
advanced western theorists. The institutional critique of equivalence 
surreptitiously dovetails into facile presumptions of progress, and 
sometimes into assumptions of west-European superiority. Perhaps 
we should take a good look at the bandwagon before we hop on. 
4. Understanding Equivalence 
Although the 1980s critiques of equivalence-based prescriptivism 
opened up new terrain, they mostly failed to understand the logic of 
the previous paradigm. Little attempt was made to objectify the 
subjective importance of equivalence as a concept. It is one thing to 
argue that substantial equivalence is an illusion, but quite another to 
understand why anyone should be prepared to believe in it. A 
pertinent lesson might be gleaned from Bourdieu: 
There is an objective truth of the subjective, even when it 
contradicts the objective truth that one constructs against it. 
Illusions are not in themselves illusory. One would betray 
objectivity if one acted as if social subjects had no representation, 
no experience of the realities that are constructed by science [...]. 
Sociology should not forget that in order for social practices to 
work, social actors must believe they are the ones who make their 
actions work. Some systems work entirely on belief, and no 
system - not even economics - can do without the belief that it 
can work. (1980, p. 32) 
Illusions are not illusory. Yet when Snell-Hornby talks about "the 
illusion of equivalence" (1988, p. 13), she does so precisely to 
3. It is to Professor Snell-Hornby's credit that, as President of the 
European Society for Translation Studies, she has spoken out 
against the reduction of Saarbrücken. 
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suggest that it is illusory and should be dispensed with. The main 
alternative to this strategy is to understand and explain the illusion. 
This second strategy has been adopted by several isolated 
authors. Ernst-August Gutt, whose application of relevance theory 
to translation deserves more attention than it has so far received, 
defines a "direct translation" as an utterance that "creates a 
presumption of complete interpretative resemblance" ( 1991, p. 186). 
True, Gutt does not name equivalence as such - it is a taboo word 
-, but he certainly describes what equivalence would seem to be 
doing when a translation is read as a translation. More important, 
this "presumption of resemblance" does not describe anything that 
would enable a linguist's tweezers to pick up two pieces of language 
and declare them of equal weight. Comparable considerations enter 
Albrecht Neubert's recent comments on equivalence. A translation, 
says Neubert, "has to stand in some kind of equivalence relation to 
the original," which means that "equivalence in translation is not an 
isolated, quasi-objective quality, it is afunctional concept that can 
be attributed to a particular translational situation" (1994, pp. 
413-414, italics in the text). From the semiotic perspective, Ubaldo 
Stecconi expresses a similar mode of thought: "Equivalence is 
crucial to translation because it is the unique intertextual relation 
that only translations, among all conceivable text types, are expected 
to show" (forthcoming). Such "expectation" is certainly an affair of 
social convention rather than empirical certainty, but it has 
consequences for the actual work of the translator. In Stecconi's 
terms, "B had never been equivalent to A before it appeared in a 
translation: using inferences of the abductive kind, the translator 
makes the two elements equivalent" (ibid). A fourth researcher 
could be cited here: Pym (1992) spends a whole chapter arguing that 
"equivalence defines translation," and in a further text (1993) talks 
about non-relativist and non-linguistic "equivalence beliefs" as part 
of the way translations are received as translations. 
These authors form no kind of group; they are more like 
lone voices in disparate wildernesses. But they are not naive 
theorists who blissfully ignore the critiques of equivalence. Despite 
apparent regression to the 1970s paradigm, these recent positions are 
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in fact exploiting the gap between translation as a social practice 
(equivalence as a necessary and functional illusion) and translation 
as actualization of prior correspondences (equivalence as something 
that linguists might hope to analyze on the basis of language alone). 
This is precisely the gap that Mounin and Koller, among others, had 
previously swept under the carpet in the interests of legitimation. 
The minority return to equivalence is thus dis-covering a problem 
that previous usages of the term had played down4. It could even 
be drawing out the critical potential of something like Toury's initial 
acceptance of equivalence. Rather than force any translator to 
become an "equivalence-seeker" (Mossop, 1983, p. 246), rather than 
assume any "rational recovery of original meaning" (Benjamin 1989, 
p. 86), the above writers emphasize that the translator is an 
equivalence producer, a professional communicator working for 
people who pay to believe that, on whatever level is pertinent, A is 
equivalent to B. In so doing, the recent references to equivalence are 
objectifying the subjective, recognizing but not necessarily 
condoning a socially operative belief that enables translations - and 
translators - to work. This position is commonly misunderstood. 
The linguistics-derived concept of equivalence was an 
expression of what translation ideally represented for certain people, 
notably translators' organizations in search of higher social status, 
readers in search of translated information, European politicians in 
search of reliable transcultural communication, and academics in 
search of authoritative science. It expressed certain ideals of 
translation as a contemporary social practice. Theories that now 
project little substantial equivalence - whether or not they use the 
term - should nevertheless be able to recognize and objectify the 
subjective interests that make translation work as a social practice. 
Translation studies cannot just put texts under linguistic 
microscopes. It must also objectify the beliefs - the current but 
4. Koller, it should be noted, had already talked about translation as 
the production {Herstellen) of equivalence (1979, pp. 187-190), 
although the significance of the term seems not to have been 
realized. 
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uncritical term is "norms" - that condition the way translations are 
received and thus the way translators tend to work. Such subjective 
beliefs obviously include the illusions that remain operative on the 
level of theory. 
5. Solutions without Equivalence 
Gutt, Neubert, Stecconi, and Pym (there could be more names) have 
something else in common. Their arguments recuperate the very 
important idea that translation and non-translation are conventionally 
distinguished, since the making of this distinction is one of the 
functions of equivalence itself. They thus have a certain interest in 
defining translation in a restrictive way; they are not afraid to 
distinguish translation from non-translation. 
If we now look at the critiques of equivalence, one feature 
seems surprisingly common to the various groups concerned. In 
contradistinction to the four authors just cited, none of the theorists 
that oppose equivalence appears to have advanced a restrictive 
definition of translation. There are certainly many descriptions; they 
all say what a translation should look like and should do. Try, for 
example, Snell-Hornby's description beginning "Translation is a 
complex act of communication in which..." (1988, p. 81). Nowhere 
in the page or so of text that follows is there anything about what 
translation is not. There are no definitions of non-translation. 
Everything can be fitted in; everything is potentially translative; so 
translation studies might as well encompass cultural studies, literary 
studies, the entire humanities, and more, if it would make anyone 
happier or more powerful. The rejection of equivalence quickly 
leads to a peculiarly uncentered conceptual expansion, the nature of 
which is still far from clear. 
Equivalence, on the other hand, no matter what definition 
it figured in during the bad old days, always implied the possibility 
of non-equivalence, of non-translation or a text that was in some 
way not fully translational. This in turn configured translation 
studies as a quite specific neck of the academic woods. The 1980s 
thus saw a shift from restrictive to non-restrictive definitions, from 
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translation studies as a focused and unified discipline to translation 
studies as an area potentially open to all comers. 
The shift was not without friction. Not everyone agrees that 
a translation can be a bibliographic reference (as in Gouadec 1989) 
or any text explaining foreign information (as in Holz-Mänttäri 
1984) or indeed any text at all (as in theories of radical 
intertextuality). The change has nevertheless been institutionally 
successful. It has inspired several good propositions for new 
disciplinary frames, including "transfer studies" (after Even-Zohar 
1990), action theory (Holz-Mänttäri 1984; Vermeer 1986,1989), and 
"rewriting" (Lefevere 1985, 1992). Strangely enough, most of the 
authors producing restrictive definitions of translation, the ones who 
place equivalence (or its surrogates) in the space of production and 
reception, also work within wider conceptual frames, be it relevance 
theory (Gutt), semiotics (Stecconi), or negotiation theory (Pym, 
1992, and forthcoming). This is a general trend; the conceptual 
expansion now exists whether or not one refers to equivalence. In 
training institutes, the new perspectives have supported numerous 
degree and diploma programmes combining translation with cultural 
studies, literary studies, documentation, terminology, international 
relations, commerce, computer science, and so on5. Everyone seems 
to agree on the need for a wider frame. To produce equivalence is 
nowadays not the end of the story, neither for the theorist nor for 
the pedagog. There is thus little subjective interest in restrictive 
definitions of translation. They exist, they stubbornly refer to 
equivalence, but they are not about to upset anyone. Once again, 
why not? 
6. Legitimation Achieved? 
If we now go back to Roller's "legitimation crisis" of 1979, we find 
that a kind of legitimation for translation studies has in fact been 
found. Koller thought the answer was to define translation studies 
as a science and to regulate its relations with neighboring 
5. See Caminade in this volume. 
169 
disciplines. But on the ground, the historical solution has been to 
deregulate relations, allowing translation to be studied in any 
number of disciplinary locations, in terms of any number of 
non-restrictive definitions. Instead of a wholly independent 
translation studies, we now have a fairly unruly grouping of 
approaches and interests that cover far more than any equivalence-
bound definition of translation. Gideon Toury's description of 
translation studies as an "interdiscipline" is currently as accurate as 
it is widely accepted (a very large congress held in Vienna in 1992 
was actually called "Translation Studies, An Interdiscipline"). There 
is also a level of civil organization that should prove greater than 
any formal theory. As Althusser was wont to say, the solution to 
theoretical problems already exists on the level of practice, if you 
know where to look. Non-restrictive deregulation has been the 
practical solution, although not necessarily the best one. 
Whereas Snell-Hornby sought to enact a centered integration 
in the 1980s, an upsetting sociology could now show that 
successfully uncentered disintegration was going on at the same 
time. This second reality, the historical solution to a legitimation 
crisis, is still worth dis-covering. 
7. A Summary 
Since debates over equivalence are not always easy to follow, here 
is a brief summary of the way I have called the shots: 
. Structuralist linguistics of language systems (Saussure et al.) 
overlooked the social existence of translation. 
. The concept of translational equivalence (Koller et al) affirmed 
the social existence of translation and sought to make it a part of 
applied linguistics. 
. Historico-descriptive studies (Toury et ai) rejected the prescriptive 
import of such linguistics and affirmed that equivalence was a fact 
of all translations, no matter what their quality. 
. Theories of target-side functionalism (Vermeer et al.) similarly 
rejected such prescriptivism, limiting equivalence to cases where the 
translation purpose was narrowly bound by source-text elements. 
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. Thanks to these two movements, the notion of equivalence lost its 
status as a scientific concept (most radically in the work of 
Snell-Hornby). 
. Translation studies has thus expanded well beyond the academic 
space once centered on equivalence. 
. A few isolated voices, including the present author, have 
nevertheless recuperated the notion of equivalence as an affirmation 
of the social existence of translation, without associating the term 
with any prescriptive linguistics. They thus reveal the inability of 
expansive translation studies to offer a restrictive definition of 
translation. 
Envoi 
In 1992, Susan Bassnett and André Lefevere declared that "[t]he 
growth of translation studies as a separate discipline is a success 
story of the 1980s" (1992, p. xi). Success for whom? And at what 
price? It is worth recalling that Lefevere, in an article published just 
one year before, argued against an independent translation studies, 
which he regarded as "most unlikely to make the distinction between 
literary and non-literary, or technical translation" (1991, p. 131). 
Success, for Lefevere, was obviously a question of keeping 
translation studies attached to literary studies, just as others wanted 
to keep it attached to linguistics, and still others could see nothing 
but translator training. Squabbles about equivalence marked the 
borders between these various visions of academic paradise. Success 
for me, of course, would be a translation studies inspired by 
Bourdieu's sociology. We all have our private backgrounds and 
agendas. 
It must nevertheless be admitted that translation studies has 
expanded in more than one direction. The reasons are perhaps not 
always obvious. Youth unemployment means students enrol in 
something that sounds marketable; European integration means some 
national politicians are willing to fund practical-sounding translation 
research; and some literature departments, at various stages of 
conceptual bankruptcy, have managed to hitch a ride into unknown 
territory. Few would claim that translation studies has really 
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succeeded as an academic discipline with something of its own to 
say to other disciplines. In significant contradistinction to 
developments on the other side of the Atlantic, European translation 
scholars have been strangely reluctant or unable to engage in wider 
social or academic debates. Although translation inevitably concerns 
extremely problematic phenomena like traditional canons, cultural 
specificity, political identity, and nationalist combinations of all 
three, most theorists have stayed clear of such turbulent waters. 
There has been virtually no deconstruction, little feminism6, scant 
critique of European east-west relations, no more than lip-service to 
the translation costs that risk crippling the European Union, and 
minimal critique of a thing called "culture" that remains so vague it 
couldn't upset anyone's idea of a culture. Translation studies 
remained intellectually mediocre throughout the 1980s and is 
struggling to find orientation in the 1990s. Many of its theoretical 
efforts have been directed toward gaining academic power rather 
than identifying and solving significant social problems. Now 
enjoying what some see as success, with or without equivalence, 
European translation studies upsets virtually no one. Such has been 
the price of its disintegrative expansion. 
Anthony Pym: Universität Rovira i Virgili, Departamentde filologia 
anglo-germanica. Plaça Imperial Tarraco, 1-43 005 Tarragona, 
Espana. 
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ABSTRACT: European Translation Studies, Une science qui 
dérange, and Why Equivalence Needn't Be a Dirty Word — 
Debates about equivalence have marked the development of 
European translation studies since the 1970s, forming a significant 
frame for the institutional legitimation of the discipline. A brief 
survey of these debates, carried out in terms of Bourdieu's defence 
of sociology as an "upsetting" science, distinguishes between the 
precarious legitimation of linguistic-based equivalence in the 1970s 
and several target-side critiques directed at the concept in the 1980s. 
However, the alternative institutional legitimation associated with the 
critiques of equivalence may well have been conceptually 
desintegrative and intellectually mediocre. It is concluded that 
translation studies could now become properly upsetting by 
returning to equivalence and considering it as an operative illusion 
necessary for the definition and social function of any translation. 
RÉSUMÉ: La Traductologie en Europe, Une science qui 
dérange, et Pourquoi «Équivalence» n'est pas forcément un gros 
mot — Les débats sur l'équivalence marquent le développement de 
la traductologie européenne depuis les années 1970 et constituent un 
cadre important de légitimation institutionnelle de la discipline. Un 
bref panorama de ces débats est effectué en appliquant à la 
traductologie les termes que Pierre Bourdieu utilise pour la défense 
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de la sociologie, «une science qui dérange». Ces débats se 
caractérisent, d'une part, par la légitimation précaire de 
l'équivalence linguistique dans les années 1970 et, d'autre part, par 
une série de critiques de l'équivalence - formulées au cours des 
années 1980 - dérivant de la priorité accordée aux facteurs cibles. 
Cependant, il est possible que la légitimation institutionnelle associée 
aux critiques de l'équivalence ait eu un effet désintégrateur sur la 
conceptualisation en traductologie et qu'elle ait été intellectuellement 
médiocre. Pour devenir une science proprement dérangeante, la 
traductologie pourrait revenir à l'équivalence en la considérant cette 
fois comme une illusion opératoire nécessaire à la définition et à la 
fonction sociale de toute traduction. 
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